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Functional Neuroimaging: Technical, Logical, and Social Perspectives
Abstract
Neuroscientists have long sought to study the dynamic activity of the human brain—what's happening in
the brain, that is, while people are thinking, feeling, and acting. Ideally, an inside look at brain function
would simultaneously and continuously measure the biochemical state of every cell in the central nervous
system. While such a miraculous method is science fiction, a century of progress in neuroimaging
technologies has made such simultaneous and continuous measurement a plausible fiction. Despite this
progress, practitioners of modern neuroimaging struggle with two kinds of limitations: those that attend
the particular neuroimaging methods we have today and those that would limit any method of imaging
neural activity, no matter how powerful.
In this essay, I consider the liabilities and potential of techniques that measure human brain activity. I am
concerned here only with methods that measure relevant physiologic states of the central nervous
system and relate those measures to particular mental states. I will consider in particular the preeminent
method of functional neuroimaging: BOLD fMRI. While there are several practical limits on the biological
information that current technologies can measure, these limits—as important as they are—are minor in
comparison to the fundamental logical restraints on the conclusions that can be drawn from brain
imaging studies.
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Functional neuroimaging:
Technical, Logical, and Social perspectives
Geoffrey K Aguirre
Neuroscientists have long sought to study the dynamic activity of the human brain while
people think, feel, and act. Ideally, an inside look at brain function would simultaneously
and continuously measure the biochemical state of every cell in the central nervous
system. While such a miraculous method is science fiction, a century of progress in
neuroimaging technologies has made it a plausible fiction.
Non-invasive measures of neural function have been available since the 1920s, when
electroencephalography (EEG) was developed to measure at the scalp the electrical
signals of brain activity. Other techniques, such as positron emission tomography (PET)
and single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT), followed in the 1980s and
improved upon the crude spatial resolution of EEG. A major subsequent advance
occurred in the 1990s, with the advent of blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD)
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). This last technique has ushered in the
modern revolution of neuroimaging, as it provides non-invasive, rapid, high-resolution
images of the brain in action, and in the past two decades in particular, these
technologies have become both more precise and much more widely used. Despite this
progress, practitioners of modern neuroimaging struggle with two limitations: those that
attend the particular neuroimaging methods we have today, and those that would limit
even the imaginary technique of omniscient imaging.
I consider in this paper the liabilities and potential of techniques that measure human
brain activity. There are many interventional procedures that examine the relationship
between brain and behavior, but I am concerned here only with methods that measure
relevant physiologic states of the central nervous system and relate those measures to
particular mental states. I will consider in particular the preeminent method of functional
neuroimaging: BOLD fMRI. While there are several practical limits on the biological
information that current technologies can measure, these limits—as important as they
are—are minor in comparison with the fundamental, logical restraints upon the
conclusions that can be drawn from brain imaging studies. Below, I consider how these
logical limitations differ for the different types of questions that might be asked using
neuroimaging.
The limits of neuroimaging technologies are well understood within the scientific areas
in which neuroimaging is a mature technique. During its rapid growth, however,
neuroimaging has made multiple lateral moves to new areas of intellectual investigation.
A feature of this “imaging colonization” is that the method has moved more quickly than
the hard-won cautionary experience. The ubiquity and availability of the hardware and
software to collect data and produce brain images has contributed to a tendency for the
initial neuroimaging work in new fields to lack the methodological rigor present in more
established areas.

Despite many cautions and limitations, I will close this paper by recognizing the
astonishing power of neuroimaging techniques. Contrary to the claims of some critics,
neuroimaging is not simply a modern phrenology. As the field embraces new, powerful
analytic techniques, there has been a shift from explanation to prediction. This transition
brings neuroimaging to the brink of science fiction, providing a method to access the
private mental states and traits of individuals who choose to cooperate with a brain
scan.
What do Neuroimaging Technologies Measure?
The bio-electrical basis of human brain function has been studied since the early 1800s,
although initially with undesirable invasiveness to circumvent the electrical insulation of
the skull. The modern era of non-invasive measurement of human brain activity began
in the 1920s with Hans Berger’s development of the electroencephalograph. There has
been a profusion of neuroimaging methods since, spawning an alphabet soup of neuroinitialisms: e.g. SPECT, PET, MEG, EEG, BOLD fMRI, ASL, and NIRS (see glossary
and annotated bibliography at the end).
Despite this daunting variety, the non-invasive measurement of human brain activity
may be divided into several broad techniques: (a) those that directly measure the
electro-magnetic fields produced by active neurons, and (b) those that measure the
metabolic activity of neurons, and those ( c) that measure the local changes in blood
flow that are produced by brain activity.
(a) Directly measuring electrical activity in the brain
The fundamental means of information transfer in the nervous system is the
movement of charged particles (ions) across the cell membranes of neurons. This
movement produces an electrical current and changes the electrical potential
(voltage) of the cells. Measurement of these voltage changes is the basis of EEG
and ERP, while MEG measures disturbance of the local magnetic field produced by
the neural current. These kinds of neuroimaging studies are often referred to as
“electrophysiologic” techniques.
(b) Measuring neural metabolism
Neurons consume glucose (a simple sugar) and oxygen to fuel their biological
activity. Two neuroimaging technologies that measure this metabolic function are
PET and SPECT. These are nuclear medicine techniques in which a radio-labeled
compound is injected into the bloodstream (or in some approaches, inhaled) and
then travels to the brain. In one application, glucose molecules are modified to carry
a radioactive isotope of carbon. The modified glucose is taken up by nerve cells and
when the carbon atom undergoes radioactive decay, energetic particles are emitted
that are recorded by a detector around the subject’s head. The amount and location
of this radioactivity pinpoints areas of increased glucose consumption and thus
neural activity. Depending upon the compound to which the radioactive isotope is
attached, these techniques can measure different metabolic and physiologic aspects
of neural function.
!2

(c) Measuring neuro-vascular changes
A fortuitous property of brain physiology is that local changes in neural activity give
rise to local changes in blood flow and blood oxygenation. This “neuro-vascular”
coupling is sensible from a teleological perspective. Increases in the computational
activities of neurons requires an increased supply of oxygen and glucose fuel, and
an increased need to clear away the byproducts of metabolism. Correspondingly,
when neurons increase their activity, local blood vessels increase in size, allowing
more blood to flow to the active area. Brain activity and blood flow is tightly coupled
on a spatial scale, with an increase in blood flow localized to only 3-5mm around an
active point in the brain. More oxygen is delivered to active parts of the brain than is
actually consumed by the neurons. Therefore, there is a paradoxical increase in the
concentration of oxygen in brain areas with increase activity.
Measurement of this local increase in tissue oxygenation that follows neural activity
is the fundamental basis of the preeminent neuroimaging technique: Blood Oxygen
Level Dependent (BOLD) functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). The
manner by which an MRI scanner ultimately measures this proxy of neural activity is
the consequence of a chain of associations in physics and physiology.
Hemoglobin is the primary oxygen carrying molecule in the blood. At its center, each
hemoglobin molecule contains an iron atom. Iron, in turn, has slightly different
magnetic properties depending upon whether the hemoglobin is currently carrying
oxygen or is not. An MRI scanner (which is itself a very strong magnet) can be made
sensitive to this tiny difference in the magnetic property of blood when it has more or
less oxygen present.
In sum, an increase in the activity of neurons at a point in the brain increases blood
flow to that area. This increased blood flow brings in more fresh oxygen, which alters
the magnetic properties of the iron atoms in hemoglobin molecules. The scanner,
then, measures this alteration of magnetic strength. This chain of associations is
what allows fMRI to make indirect measurements of neural activity.
These different kinds of neuroimaging techniques make different sacrifices in spatial
and temporal resolution. The electrically-based measures provide high temporal
resolution, with the ability to examine the evolution of neural activity across the brain on
a millisecond basis. However, the distortion of electrical and magnetic fields produced
by the skull and scalp leave these techniques with coarse spatial resolution. In contrast,
the metabolic and neuro-vascular techniques, such as BOLD fMRI and PET, have better
spatial resolution, but relatively poor temporal resolution as changes in these metabolic
measures lag behind the changes in brain activity.
A catalog of additional caveats and idiosyncracies accompany all of these neuroimaging
technique. And while particular situations might favor one technique over another, BOLD
fMRI has become the preeminent method of non-invasive measurement of brain activity
because in many cases it provides a desirable balance between temporal and spatial
resolution. Additionally, fMRI scanning does not expose the subject to ionizing radiation,

obtains data from the entire brain, and provides a signal that is strong in relation to
sources of noise.
Because of the near-ubiquity of fMRI, I will focus upon this neuroimaging tool, and next
consider how the data collected by the scanner is refined and processed to produce the
colorful brain images that now decorate so many scientific articles and lay-press reports
of neuroscience.
BOLD fMRI: From Raw Data to Colorful Images
BOLD fMRI scanners break the brain down into tens of thousands of tiny cubes called
“voxels,” which are the fundamental unit of measurement for fMRI studies. Voxels are
usually between 0.5-3 mm per side and they contain tens to hundreds of thousands of
neurons. The scanner makes measurements of activity over the entire brain every 1-3
seconds, with a typical study requiring about an hour to complete for one person.

Figure 1a

1b

BOLD fMRI signal

Images created from this raw data look quite different from the sharp pictures of brain
activity usually associated with a clinical MRI scan. Figure 1a shows a single, horizontal
slice through the brain at one point in time. A scan of the entire brain is composed of a
stack of these 2-dimensional slices, and the entire data set is a series of these slices
over time. In this image, which is coarse and fuzzy, the darker and lighter shades
correspond to the relative magnetic effects of oxygenated blood across the brain. With
increases in neural activity, the image becomes lighted at a given point as oxygen
content increases with increased blood flow.

The data from a neuroimaging experiment are often analyzed by considering the profile
of signal over time from each point in the brain. Figure 1b shows the time-series
response for a single voxel in a hypothetical experiment. You can see that the signal
from this particular voxel goes up when the fearful face is shown and down when the
neutral face is shown, indicating that seeing a face with emotional content creates a
demand for oxygen in that voxel, presumably because the neurons in that voxel become
more active when the subject is looking at fearful faces. You may also notice that the
response is a little delayed and that it lasts for a while (it isn’t a quick spike). Indeed an
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important feature of the fMRI signal is that it is both delayed and dispersed with respect
to the stimuli (and, presumably, neural events) that evoked the response—the person in
the scanner sees the fearful face and experiences an immediate and short-lived
response to it, but the scanner detects a slightly delayed response that stretches out
over several seconds. This is because fMRI measures the physiologic, hemodynamic
events (changes in the amount of oxygen in cells) that are the downstream product of
neural activity and not the neural activity itself.
Another way of stating this point is to say that the spatial and temporal resolution of
fMRI is limited by the neuro-vascular coupling that is the source of contrast (it is limited
by the nature of what is being measured). While MRI images can be obtained as rapidly
as every 100 milliseconds, and with spatial resolution in the tenths of a millimeter, this
fine resolution has little practical advantage for fMRI. Changes in neural activity, which
are often very quick and can be very localized, give rise to a change in blood flow and
oxygenation (and thus a change in the fMRI signal) that evolves over seconds and that
spreads over several millimeters, making it impossible to identify precisely which
neurons were active. As a result of these inherent limits, fMRI images are seldom
acquired more frequently than once a second and are typically composed of voxels no
smaller than 1 mm per side.
Ideally, fMRI data would be acquired from motionless brains of uniform shape.
Unfortunately, this is not the case, and a number of processing steps are performed on
the data to correct for what researchers call “imaging artifacts.” The need for some of
these steps is easily understood. For example, there is inevitably some degree of
movement of the head during scanning, which can be corrected in a manner similar to
“image stabilization” technology in video cameras. Similarly, because the beating of the
heart and the respiratory cycle can affect the fMRI signal, the cardio-pulmonary cycle is
measured during scanning and its physiologic artifacts are removed. Other processing
steps are more esoteric consequences of the properties of fMRI imaging, but are no
less essential to conduct.
Even after correcting for motion and other artifacts, it is usually the case that the fMRI
signal that is produced by changes in neural activity is small compared with the random
variation present in the data. This random variation in brain activity is not a result of
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exposure to the stimuli (in this example, face pictures). Instead, there is always activity
in the brain, even when we sleep. Statistical tests are required to distinguish between
the changes in brain signal that result from the experiment, and those random
fluctuations which would have been present regardless. In most cases the time-series
data from each voxel are compared with a predicted response, and the statistical
reliability of this effect is measured. Figure 2, for example, illustrates how a t-statistic (a
measure of statistical likelihood) can be calculated by examining the amount of variation
in one voxel’s time-series data that can be explained by switching between the two
different faces. This calculation yields a statistical value for the time-series data for one
voxel—a probability that the change corresponds to the manipulation of interest. To
simplify the display of these results, it is common practice to color-code the voxel from
which the time-series was taken. Often, a red-to-yellow scale is used to indicate the
strength of the statistical association.
This calculation can be conducted in a similar manner for every voxel in the brain,
yielding a map of the statistical effect of the experiment at each point in the brain over
time. This statistical map is the final result of many neuroimaging studies.
There are a few additional steps, however, that lie between the calculation of a
statistical map and the display of the result in a scientific publication (Figure 3). The
statistical map has a value for every point in the brain. Because there are so many
voxels in a typical neuroimaging study (on the order of 100,000), it is overwhelmingly
likely that random fluctuation in the fMRI signal will just happen to produce large
statistical values in some voxels, even if the experiment had no actual effect on those
voxels. Therefore, it is common practice to adopt a threshold that corrects for the
number of voxels studied, and only accept statistical values that are unlikely to have
occurred by chance (Figure 3). Data below this threshold are discarded, leaving a
“cleaner” image representing only changes in blood oxygenation that are likely to have
resulted from the experimental stimulus.
Next, it is common practice to digitally “smooth” fMRI data, blurring the measurement
from one point in the brain with adjacent points. This may initially seem like an
undesirable thing to do, as the blurring reduces the precision with which a brain activity
change can be assigned to a particular point in the brain and makes it likely that very
small areas of activity will be blurred to the point of being no longer visible. These
Figure 3
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limitations, however, are balanced by improvements in statistical power (by reducing the
number of independent statistical tests that need to be performed in the smoother data).
Additionally, when analyzing data across different people, spatial smoothing helps to
overcome residual differences in anatomy between subjects that might otherwise render
common areas of activation non-overlapping (i.e. smoothing helps reveal what is in
common in brain response across individuals).
A third step is to lay the data on top of a high-resolution, anatomical image. As we have
seen, the raw functional fMRI data are coarse, making it difficult to discern the location
of specific brain structures. For this reason, the smoothed and thresholded statistical
maps are usually displayed atop high-resolution, anatomical images of brain structure
that are acquired during the same session as the functional activation data. This step
simplifies the localization of sites of neuroimaging response to brain anatomy.
Finally, the combined functional and anatomical volume must be displayed. Because the
result is three-dimensional, some display options are cumbersome. For example, some
neuroimaging studies display the results as a series of 2-dimensional slices through the
data, starting (for example) at the bottom of the brain and moving up, slice-by-slice. An
alternative, and increasingly popular, display approach is to produce a threedimensional, digital rendering of the cortical surface and then display the color-coded,
above-threshold statistical results upon it. In some applications, the cortical surface is
digitally separated from the underlying brain structure, and flattened into a sheet,
allowing the areas of statistical response from within the curves and folds of the brain to
be seen easily.
Each of these display steps is designed to facilitate the communication of results while
still accurately reporting the data. It is important to realize, however, how far we have
travelled from the initial, fuzzy functional activation data (Figure 1a) to the final, polished
result (Figure 3, right). While these steps are well justified from a scientific standpoint, in
aggregate they have come to constitute an aesthetic; there is a certain way that
neuroimaging results are “expected” to look. I will consider the consequences of these
aesthetic choices below.
Practical Limits of fMRI
While there has been remarkable progress over the past century, there remain
considerable limits on the quantity and quality of information that may be derived from
neuroimaging techniques in general and from fMRI in particular.
Many of these limits relate to the possibility that the imaging method may fail to
measure a relevant aspect of nervous system function. While we have considered so far
“brain activity” in aggregate, there is actually a diverse array of cell types in the brai
(neurons and supporting glial cells) all communicating with a variety of
neurotransmitters and stimulating different types of receptors. Beyond the on-going
electrical activity of neurons, brain function includes activity driven changes in DNA
transcription, regulation of the expression of channels in the cell membrane, synaptic
pruning, and even the modulation of neurogenesis in some areas of cortex. Functional
MRI reduces this symphony of biological function to a single note of neural “activity”.

The fMRI signal is driven primarily by the release of neuro-transmitter at the connection
points between neurons, which (under most physiologic circumstances) is proportional
to the electrical activity of neurons. The measure does not indicate which
neurotransmitter was released, if it had an excitatory or an inhibitory effect upon the
receiving neuron, or even if the activity is within a local network of neurons or the result
of activity from distant cell bodies. The practical consequence of this jargon-laden
summary is that the same fMRI signal may be obtained for a diverse set of underlying
brain cell operations. We do not know what “more” of the imaging signal means in terms
of neural function. Also, the fMRI signal is likely insensitive to many critical aspects of
neural computation—it just cannot detect all relevant neural changes in response to a
mental state of interest.
Further, the imaging signal is integrated over several seconds of time and several
hundreds of thousands of neurons. Consequently, some neural activity cannot be
detected using fMRI. For example, a neural signal that rises and falls every second
would appear as an unchanging, average signal with fMRI; the blood vessels simply
cannot change rapidly enough to keep up with that speed of alternation of neural
activity. Similarly, two different mental states might have identical aggregate levels of
BOLD signal in a particular brain region, but differ critically in how this activity is
distributed over a population of neurons. Functional MRI may not pick up these
differences.
There are additional limitations that follow from generalizing neuroimaging results from
individuals to populations. Different people have different shaped brains. These
differences cannot be resolved through simple scaling, and they extend to the complex
pattern of gyral and sulcal folds that comprise the cortical surface. While there have
been enormous advances in computational techniques to match brain anatomy between
individuals, irreducible differences between people in the mapping of structure-tofunction provide one boundary on the translation of group results to individuals. In
addition, different people have different lifestyles and medication regimens, which can
alter the fMRI signal in surprising ways. The technique relies critically upon the steady
response of blood flow to changes in neuron activity. Medical states and drug effects
can alter this neuro-vascular coupling, confounding measurements of brain activity. For
example, drinking coffee before a fMRI scan can markedly increase the signal, while
taking an ibuprofen can abolish it.
Finally, a perhaps welcome limitation of brain imaging technology is the requirement for
a cooperative subject. The measurement of subtle aspects of neural response often
requires an hour or more of data collection, during which the subject must hold still and
attend to the instructions and stimuli presented. Those who conduct neuroimaging
studies in children, patient populations, the elderly, or almost any group beside eager
college students, quickly discover how difficult it is to obtain these data even from willing
participants. It would be trivially easy for a coerced subject to deny a neuroimager
useful data through any one of several countermeasures, ranging from averting one’s
eyes from presented to stimuli, to making small head movements, to actively directing
one’s thoughts to other subjects. And for those who would fear clandestine
neuroimaging, cataloging our mental states and traits without our knowledge, it is
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reassuring to observe that there is nothing subtle about a 35-ton machine that clangs at
100 decibels while in operation.
It should be noted that each of these practical barriers, and many more not considered
here, are the target of a sustained research assault. Already, clever experimental design
can provide access to some neural information below the ostensible temporal and
spatial resolution of the technique. Advances in between-person brain alignment, based
upon the pattern of cortical surface topology, appear able to overcome much of the
anatomical difference between individuals, providing surprisingly good registration of
functional mapping across individuals. Subject cooperation has also become less critical
with the advent of “resting-state” neuroimaging methods. In these studies, discussed in
greater detail below, the pattern of correlated activity across brain regions is obtained
while subjects daydream without explicit instructions or stimuli. The observed patterns
have been found to correlate with subject traits and states, and to support classification
of individuals into diagnostic categories. Further, incremental improvement of
neuroimaging approaches will wear down these limits, and bring the technology ever
closer to the theoretical limit of what might be learned.
Theoretical Limits of Neuroscientific Inference
There is diversity not only in neuroimaging methods, but in the kinds of studies in which
these techniques are used. Despite the variety, we can break these studies into two
overarching types. The first falls in the domain of neuroscience and asks “why” and
“how” questions about the relationship between brain and behavior. These studies
examine the “neural basis” of a particular emotional or mental state, and seek to
understand complex cognitive operations by looking at more elemental neural and
psychological units. The second, broad category of study adopts an a-theoretical
stance, and asks whether a particular neuroimaging finding can predict (with some
accuracy) behavior now or in the future. We consider first these neuroscientific
applications of brain imaging that seek to understand the neural mechanisms that link
brain function and mental states.
These neuroscience applications of brain imaging generally pose questions about the
relationship of the brain and behavior in one of two “directions: Forward or reverse
inference. Forward inference studies examine the anatomical, neural correlates of a
given mental operation, and are often used to investigate localization questions; that is,
to work out which areas of the brain are active during a particular experimental
condition. Generally, the subject is presented with instructions and stimuli designed to
selectively evoke a particular mental or emotional state of interest, and the
neuroimaging method identifies if and where changes in neural activity accompany that
cognitive process.
For example, does perception of a human face activate a particular area of the brain
different from that evoked by perception of other stimuli? The key assumption for this
type of study design is that a given cognitive process exists and that the task isolates
only that cognitive process. Various manipulations of stimuli and instructions are used in
an attempt to isolate the mental operation of interest from the other processes that
invariably are present (e.g., neural process required to push a button or prepare a
response or understand what the instructor is saying, etc.). Often, an "experimental"

condition is contrasted with a "control" condition that is designed to evoke all of the
cognitive processes present in the experimental period except the cognitive process of
interest. This approach is sometimes referred to as “cognitive subtraction”, as the aim is
to “subtract” away the undesired mental states, leaving behind the mental state to be
studied. This assumption that a mental state or cognitive operation can be purely
isolated through a behavioral manipulation lies at the heart of every forward inference
study, and is a key inferential weakness. Even the cooperative subject might, for
example, engage other, confounding, mental operations unintentionally, rendering this
assumption invalid.
Neuroscience studies also examine the relationship between brain and behavior in the
“reverse” direction. Reverse inference studies leverage knowledge about the neural
correlates of particular mental states to learn something about an imperfectly
understood behavior. One begins by assuming that neural activity in a particular area of
the brain is a marker of the presence of a particular mental state and no other. For
example, neural activity of a certain magnitude at a certain spot in the fusiform gyrus
may be assumed to indicate that the subject is in the behavioral state of seeing a
human face. The subject then performs a task which may or may not evoke the
cognitive process of interest. For example, ambiguous stimuli are presented that may
be perceived as a face or a vase. If the specified neural activity is seen, the conclusion
is drawn that the subject saw a face at that moment in time. Reverse inference studies
have been the basis of the rapidly growing fields of emotional, social, and economic
neuroscience, in which activity in certain brain locations is taken as evidence of a
particular emotional or cognitive state.
What provides the evidence that a particular region of the brain is uniquely activated by
a specific cognitive process? Logically, only an exhaustive, enumerative induction in
which neuroimaging is used to examine every possible cognitive process, under every
possible circumstance. This is obviously practically impossible, so a series of
neuroimaging experiments that demonstrate activation of a particular region during a
given cognitive process and no other usually suffices to support the assumption.
Naturally, neuroimaging studies differ in the quality of the evidence to support the
reverse inference. In some cases, it may be readily shown that different mental
operations are, in fact, capable of activating the same brain region—that is, that the
reverse inference study is invalid.
From neuroscientific cause to behavioral prediction
I have considered neuroimaging studies that seek to understand cause, specifically how
does neural activity cause behavior (or, what is going on in the brain when a person
behaves one way verses another?). This worthy enterprise faces the inferential
challenges common to any scientific endeavor that seeks a mechanistic or causal
between the phenomena being studied. Namely, imperfect control over the thing the
experiment manipulates (in this case, behavior and mental states) leads to uncertainty
when concluding how the manipulation relates to the measurement.
There is, however, another type of neuroimaging study that asks rather different
questions, and consequently avoids these inferential limitations. In this approach the
goal is not to understand how or why behavior and brain states are related, but simply
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to provide accurate predictions about behavior from brain state measurements.
Eschewing a neuroscientific account of how, this prediction approach asks only if a
given pattern of brain imaging data predicts a given behavior now or in the future. As an
illustration, consider the inferential differences between the following claims that might
be made of a neuroimaging study:
(a) Activity in the nucleus accumbens (a part of the brain associated with “reward”
signals) is increased when a person addicted to cocaine views pictures of drug
paraphernalia. Therefore, drug addicted people experience a sense of craving
when viewing pictures of drug paraphernalia.
(b) The amount of activity in the nucleus accumbens in response to pictures of drug
paraphernalia predicts the likelihood that someone will have a positive urine test
for cocaine in the week following the brain imaging study.
The first claim concludes that a particular mental state has been evoked in people by
viewing activity within their brain. This conclusion is dependent upon knowing that
activity in the brain region (the nucleus accumbens) is uniquely associated with a sense
of craving. This is a fundamentally difficult assumption to support. While the study might
be able to convincingly claim that there is a difference in brain response to the pictures
between people who use drugs and those who don’t, attributing those differences to a
particular mental state (craving) is challenging. Indeed, the claim that the brain activity
difference between the groups is due to being drug addicted per se is challenging.
Perhaps (for example) drug users are more alert, and simply pay closer attention to the
pictures in the experiment, resulting in a larger brain response for this group compared
to the non-addicted control subjects.
In contrast, the second claim concerns matters that are more easily measured and
verified. The study has confirmed a prediction: if there is a large brain response to the
pictures shown to the subject, they are more likely to use cocaine in the following week.
Apart from challenging the accuracy of the urine testing, the conclusion is fairly
unassailable.
Importantly, this second kind of claim makes no mention of mental states or mechanism.
The predictive accuracy of responses from this point in the brain for drug use could be
because this brain region is related to craving. But the prediction could also succeed if
the increased activity in the drug addicted is from some other mental state, or even from
some confounding medical or physiologic state that just happens itself to predict drug
use. The shift in stance from providing an account of the mechanisms of cognition to
simply trying to make accurate predictions of behavior frees the study from many
inferential shackles.
Almost any neuroimaging study, with a variety of experimental designs and data
analysis approaches, may be used in the service of either of these two types of
inferential claim. In the last decade, however, two particular neuroimaging approaches
have become increasingly associated with the second, predictive application of
neuroimaging, indicating a shift among some researchers from studying cause, to
predicting an effect.

MVPA and Resting State studies
Multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) is the name given to neuroimaging studies that
generally avoid localizing mental operations, but instead consider the distributed and
complex pattern of neural response that stimuli or experimental conditions might evoke
across the entire brain. Typically, there is an initial “training” phase, during which the
distributed neural response to a set of stimuli or conditions is measured. The goal is to
repeatedly evoke a particular mental state or behavior in the participant under a variety
of circumstances. The commonalities in brain response across these presentations are
identified by computer software (generally, “machine learning algorithms”). At the end of
the training phase, the computer has identified that a particular pattern of brain
response is evoked by a particular stimulus or behavior.
Next, there is a “test” phase, during which the subject is shown other stimuli or asked to
engage in certain behaviors and the software attempts to classify the evoked brain
states according to the patterns learned during the training phase. In effect, can the
pattern of brain activity the subject currently has be matched to one of the patterns
learned during the training phase? In this manner, MVPA studies have been used to
“read out” from the pattern of brain activity (for example) which one of many pictures a
person is currently viewing, or whether the subject is currently mentally adding or
subtracting a pair of numbers.
The information used for the training and testing phases of these studies can be of
different kinds, and in principle can be conducted within or across subjects. For
example, a computer classifier can learn the consistent pattern of brain activity evoked
by different uncomfortable stimuli (e.g., a hot wire on the skin or a sharp pin), and then
in the test phase be used to predict the subjective pain report a given person will
provide to some novel painful stimulus. As another example, people who smoke could
undergo brain scanning while they watch different videos of smoking cessation
advertisements. The machine learning algorithm would then be trained to associate a
particular pattern of brain response to the chance that the person will have quit
cigarettes a month later. In the test phase, the experiment might ask if the pattern of
brain activity observed in response to new advertisements can predict the effectiveness
of their use in a smoking cessation campaign.
The key challenge that these predictive studies face is demonstrating that the ability of
the brain measurement to predict behavior can extend beyond the particular type of
stimuli or experimental states studied. For example, can the measurement of subjective
sensation of pain generalize to other types of painful stimuli? Chronic pain? Emotional
pain? A strength of prediction studies, however, is that these questions may be
addressed in a fairly direct empirical manner, without overt concern for the
neuroscientific basis of the success or failure of the generalization. Indeed, if one cares
only about making accurate predictions, the details of what aspects of brain function are
providing the predictive information are irrelevant. If a brain scan can predict with high
accuracy which smoking cessation videos will effectively modify behavior, it in some
sense doesn’t matter what aspect of neural activity enables this prediction. Yet in
practice, there is a rich and necessary interplay between the neuroscientific and
predictive stances. For example, the prediction software can become more effective
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when it is designed using knowledge of the principles of neural response and
representation in different brain regions. Moreover, the details of how the software maps
brain states to behavioral states can serve as the basis for deep neuroscientific insights,
perhaps explored in subsequent, “hypothesis driven” studies.
In addition to MVPA studies, another kind of neuroimaging approach is also well suited
to predictive inferences. “Resting state connectivity” studies collect data from different
brain regions while the subject is in a putative “rest” state in the scanner, and not
exposed to stimuli or instructions. Data showing the patterns of resting state signals
across the brain allow researchers to divide the brain into different, functionally
connected regions. These connectivity maps may then be compared across populations
(clinical or otherwise) and between different behavioral states. A frequent initial critique
of these studies is to challenge the very notion that there is a “rest” state, and that it
would look the same in different people or groups. Rather than a limitation of this
approach, however, this fact is actually the entire point. When given no explicit
instructions regarding how to manipulate their internal mental operations, people
engage in spontaneous mental activity that is revealing about their behavioral state or
predictive of their behavioral traits. As with an MVPA studies, a radical inferential stance
adopts an agnostic view towards the meaning of particular neural patterns in such
studies, and is content to assert that given neural patterns predict with a specified
accuracy certain behaviors or group memberships. As with MVPA, the actual conduct of
this line of scientific inquiry is more often nuanced, relying on an interplay between
prediction and neuroscientific hypothesis testing.
Neuroimaging and the sociology of science
The ability to obtain non-invasive recordings of human brain activity has a nearly 100
year history, and the 20th anniversary of the development of functional MRI has recently
passed. During this time, enormous effort has been expended to refine, validate, and
expand the analytical and inferential tools of neuroimaging. It is now possible to conduct
an fMRI study with great confidence in the statistical validity of the results and with
clear-eyed understanding of the assumptions upon which any claims are based. Despite
this, critics of neuroimaging can point accurately to many studies that make breathless
—and arguably baseless—claims regarding the brain and behavior. What factors might
contribute to the discrepancy between the available rigor and promise of neuroimaging
techniques and the proliferation of studies of questionable quality? Further, why is it that
neuroimaging studies seem to have such an outsize influence upon scientific
discourse?
I believe that the marked variability of research quality in neuroimaging may be
attributed to the manner in which neuroimaging techniques have spread within and
between academic disciplines. Before the advent of fMRI, PET scanning was the
primary means of obtaining images of brain activity. PET scanners are specialized
medical devices, requiring a cyclotron and the injection of radioisotopes, which greatly
limited the availability of the technology. The development of fMRI, however, radically
altered this situation. MRI scanners are nearly ubiquitous in modern hospitals, and while
some equipment upgrades improve the quality of the data, even a standard, clinical MRI
machine may be used for neuroimaging studies. This produced a rapid and
revolutionary democratization of neuroimaging research.

The easy collection of data, however, raised the challenge: How would it be analyzed?
Functional MRI data sets are large and, as described above, must be subjected to fairly
involved pre-processing and statistical analyses to account for the many idiosyncratic
properties of the data in space and time. The quantitative and statistical knowledge
necessary to analyze this data is quite specialized, and requires in addition some skill
with computer programming. While it might be easy to place a subject in the scanner
and collect a gigabyte of neuroimaging data, the challenge of how to produce a result in
the form of a brain image remains.
As it happens, the ubiquity of MRI scanners intersected with the availability of free,
open-source software capable of performing these analyses. Statistical Parametric
Mapping (SPM) software, made freely available by the FIL (Functional Imaging
Laboratory of Wellcome Trust Center), provided for push-button analysis of
neuroimaging data. This software placed complicated data analysis and statistical
methods behind an easy to use graphical interface. This removed a barrier to new users
of neuroimaging methods. Indeed, the democratization of scanner and software was
perfectly timed with the rapid rise of the internet in the early 1990s, making the software
available for remote download.
Consequently, little more than research access to a hospital and an internet connection
was needed to perform neuroimaging experiments and produce pictures of the brain in
operation. Inevitably, despite the best intentions and most strenuous of educational
efforts on the part of the authors of SPM, investigators were empowered to analyze
fMRI data with minimal understanding of the many statistical processes and
assumptions which lay behind the software buttons and the brain images that they
ultimately produced. A playful analogy to this circumstance considers the difference
between long and arduous martial arts training that produces both power and
responsibility, and the provision of a gun.
The ready availability of neuroimaging hardware and software has meant that the
technique can be readily adopted in new areas of intellectual inquiry, without having to
bring along the hard-won cautionary experience that result from years of training and
experience. While best practices may be understood in areas of inquiry for which
neuroimaging is a mature technique, this is often not the case in the first, exciting rush
of novel work in a new field. Essentially, the phylogeny of the evolution of neuroimaging
technique is recapitulated anew each time fMRI seeds new ground.
This history partially accounts for the steady production of papers that aim to illuminate
and correct statistical errors that appear in the neuroimaging literature. Recent, highprofile publications have cautioned investigators to appropriately correct for multiple
statistical comparisons across the brain volume, to avoid performing statistical tests
upon data subsets that were themselves selected by that statistical test, and to test for
statistical interactions when interaction results are claimed. Each of these statistical
errors are well understood outside of (and within subsets of) neuroimaging research, but
must be reinforced anew. A deeper and more worrisome issue is that many choices are
available regarding the analysis parameters of neuroimaging data (e.g., how much to
smooth, which regions of the brain to examine, whether to remove certain effects of no
interest). Many degrees of freedom are therefore available to the investigator to explore
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the data in search of a desired result, and to offer that result as if it were the inevitable
consequence of a pre-determined analysis pathway. This is not a statistical error that is
by any means unique to neuroimaging data, but it is one that is magnified by the ease
with which the dials of the analysis may be turned on a computer screen.
The power of the brain images themselves must also be acknowledged. As I discussed
earlier, the transition from the raw, functional imaging data to the final, published brain
image involves many individual processing steps, each of which can be well justified in
scientific terms. In aggregate, however, these steps serve to produce brain images that
have a distinctive “organic” aesthetic. The favored presentation of neuroimaging data
creates the appearance that the activation is a natural property of the brain, with a scale
and smoothness that matches the anatomical structures (e.g., the cortical folds and
subcortical nuclei). Indeed, the colored blobs of functional activity look like they could
have grown there, revealed by the scanner in the same way a multiple sclerosis plaque
or benign brain tumor are revealed by a structural scan (Figure 4). The appearance of
functional neuroimaging data facilitates an interpretation of the results as representative
of a static, innate property of the brain, as opposed to the outcome of particular
experimental circumstances. Recent advances of multi-voxel analysis not withstanding,
this display aesthetic has also encouraged now outdated interpretations of brain
function and mental operations as highly localized (i.e., confined to one area of the
brain).
Figure 4

Room for astonishment
In seeking to understand the influence of neuroimaging in general, and fMRI in
particular, it must finally be acknowledged that this is an astonishing scientific tool.
Despite the blurring effect of the hemodynamic response, fMRI is routinely used to
measure the activity of as few as 23,000 neurons integrated over 3 seconds of time.1
This is a monumental accomplishment. Functional MRI provides a series of volumetric
images of the entire human brain, from motor cortex to cerebellum, each image
For details of this calculation, see: https://cfn.upenn.edu/aguirre/wiki/
public:neurons_in_a_voxel
1

composed of tiny resolution elements smaller than the tip of your pinkie, assembled into
a movie of brain activity that updates every three seconds. All this is done noninvasively, without radiation, while the subject lies comfortably in a scanner.
Despite the limitations imposed by physiology and scientific fallibility, the aggregate of
insights produced by neuroimaging is impressive, and growing rapidly. MVPA and
resting-state approaches are powerful new analytic tools, which are ushering in a
second age of neuroimaging research, with increased rigor, improved applicability to
clinical populations, and a focus upon empirical prediction. Like any other scientific
enterprise, there are fits and starts, with keen-eyed critics playing their part to sharpen
the approach.
Figure Legends
Figure 1. BOLD “echoplanar” functional data. (a) Shown is a 2-dimensional, axial
(horizontal) slice through a volume of brain activity data. The front of the head is
towards the top of the image. The super-imposed grid is a cartoon representation of the
voxels from which such an image is composed, although in reality the voxels are about
3 times smaller. (b) The time series data for one voxel (indicated in black) for a
hypothetical experiment. Consider a study in which a subject viewed pictures of faces.
Every 30 seconds these pictures changed from having a fearful expression to a neutral
expression. For the selected voxel, there might ensue a fMRI response that rose and
fell in synchrony with the change in facial expression. Each point on the plot represents
the fMRI signal value from the example voxel during the 3 seconds it took to acquire
one brain volume. The signal convincingly follows the experimental paradigm in this
cartoon example, with the expected delay and smoothing of the response in time
induced by the sluggish change in blood flow that is being measured.
Figure 2. Calculation of a statistical map. In this example, a statistical test is used to
compare the mean signal during the two experimental conditions (in reality, more
nuanced models of evoked response are used). This test yields a statistical value which
is displayed as a color code for the voxel from which the time-series was obtained. This
process is repeated for every voxel in the brain volume.
Figure 3. Display of a statistical map. Starting from the initial, volumetric statistical map,
several manipulations of the data are undertaken to report the result. These include: (i)
thresholding the map to only include those voxels with results that were unlikely to have
arisen by chance; (ii) smoothing the data in space; (iii) displaying the areas of response
on an anatomical image; and (iv) creating a digital reconstruction of the cortical surface.
Figure 4. “Organic” activation. A typical neuroimaging result is shown between (left) a
FLAIR image of a white matter lesion and (right) a gadolinium enhanced meningioma on
a T1-weighted sequence.
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